“DOGS DON’T SPEAK”. A CONSIDERATION OF THE FLOW OF KNOWLEDGE BETWEEN DOGS, ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND HUMANS by Sarah Czerny
Nar. umjet. 49/1, 2012, pp. 7–22, S. Czerny, “Dogs Don’t Speak”. A Consideration...
7
Sarah Czerny
Faculty of humanities and Social Sciences, 
University of rijeka, rijeka, Croatia
“Dogs DoN’T speak”. a CoNsiDeraTioN 
of The flow of kNowleDge beTweeN 
Dogs, aNThropologisTs aND humaNs
Within anthropological studies of the human-animal relation much has been written 
about the objectification of animals in “Euro-American” ontology and the need to 
reconsider this approach. Yet, although “Euro-American” ontologies on the human-
animal relation have been the focus of critique, I suggest that the question of how 
we might reconsider this issue is still pertinent. In this article, I offer an ethnographic 
account of dog owner narratives on the dog-owner relation in Croatia. Through a 
consideration of these narratives in terms of the “flow of knowledge” (cf. Strathern 
2004), I propose that knowledge between humans and animals is already flowing but 
it has just not been made visible as such. 
Key words: animal-human relation, knowledge production, flow
unequal exchanges
In anthropological writing on the human-animal relation, a number of authors 
(e.g. Shanklin 1985; Ingold 1988; Noske 1993; Mullin 1999) have pointed out 
that anthropological interest in this relation has taken quite a distinct focus for 
some time: namely, it focuses on what the humans are doing in these relations. 
For example, in Mullin’s overview of the anthropological treatment of the human-
animal relation, she writes: 
My impression is that scholars studying human-animal relationships seem to vary 
considerably in their attitudes toward animals, to the extent that these can be discerned, 
but noske is right that sociocultural research in this area tends to be much if not 
more concerned with humans’ relationships with other humans and has rarely 
departed from anthropocentrism. (Mullin 1999:217)
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One consequence of this interest in humans is that in these accounts animals end 
up taking the guise of “animate objects” who only become animate because of 
the interests and needs of humans. In light of this, recently there has been an 
increasingly audible call (e.g. Kohn 2007; Nadadsy 2007; Candea 2010) for a 
reconsideration of how anthropologists might analytically approach the human-
animal relation. Some scholars have argued that the anthropological analytical 
gaze should be opened up to include the interests of animals, where the relation 
between humans and animals is considered in terms of being a social relation. 
They argue this because, in their research, they have observed instances of human-
animal sociality, where the humans in such relations consider animals as persons. 
Although humans in these relations say that animals see the world in a “different”1 
way, they regard the knowledge that animals offer about the world to be just as 
meaningful as the knowledge that humans offer. 
nevertheless, these scholars highlight the presence of a formidable road block, 
which they argue needs to be addressed before it is possible to do this. This is 
that “Western” or “Euro-American” ontologies frequently do not treat animals 
as persons, but instead place them into a hierarchical relation where they are 
considered to be lower or lesser beings than humans. As Nadadsy (2007) has 
written “[V]ery few Euro-American scholars are willing to accept the proposition 
that animals might qualify as conscious actors capable of engaging in social 
relations with humans” (Nadadsy 2007:29). Therefore, the question arises as to 
how can we as anthropologists employ an analytical framework that considers the 
relation between humans and animals as a relation between persons, while at the 
same time acting as participants2 in an ontological setting that has a propensity to 
“de-personalise” them? 
In this article, I want to consider this question by offering an account of the way 
dog owners in Croatia negotiated their relations with their dogs. I do this because 
according to my observations of the way dog owners spoke about their dogs, 
their narratives appeared to be much more in keeping with non-euro-american 
discourses on the human-animal relation than with euro-american discourses. 
As I will examine in the first half of this article, although all the owners I spoke 
with maintained a conceptual difference between themselves and their dogs, in 
that they saw themselves as being members of different “species”, I do not think 
it would be possible to state that any of them saw their dogs as animate objects. 
1 Viveiros de Castro’s (1998) account on perspectivism considers this point extensively.
2 In his consideration of the distinction between Melanesian and non-Melanesian knowledge 
practices, which shares many parallels with the euro-american/non-euro-american distinction, 
Gell (1996) writes “[T]he Melanesia of GG [Gender of the Gift] is not the actual nation states of 
Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and so on, but a manner of speaking, or more 
precisely the site of certain problems of expression and understanding, peculiar to the cultural project 
of anthropology, which is (almost) exclusively a ‘western’ project, like it or not” (Gell 1996:34).
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Rather, they offered numerous instances of how “what their dogs had told them” 
had influenced the course of their everyday practices and their relations with other 
humans. In their opinion, what their dogs told them was just as meaningful as 
what other humans told them, and thus they appeared to treat their relations with 
their dogs as a social relation that was of the same importance to them as their 
social relations with other humans. In light of this observation, I think it could be 
therefore very informative to reflect upon how dog owners are constructing, and 
representing this relation with their dogs. If in the euro-american ontological setting 
dog owners are able to consider their relations with their dogs as equal social 
relations, then how might their practices inform ours? What are they doing that is 
different?
In order to contemplate this, in the second section I will place these accounts 
offered by dog owners in a comparative position with academic discourses about 
animal knowledge. Taking Strathern’s (2004) account on the travels of knowledge 
in academic social relations as the starting point for my discussion, I suggest that 
dog owners are in a position to treat their dogs’ knowledge in this way because 
they are offering them in a field of social relations that enables them to do so. 
What they present as dog knowledge is the product of their individual observations 
about their dogs’ practices. however, within academic social relations these 
observations would most probably not be considered as knowledge at all.  This is 
because in the academic field of social relations, observations about animals are 
required to go through the “scientific process” before they can be presented to others 
as knowledge, and it is these different approaches to knowledge that I discuss at 
the end of this article.
The responsibilities of “ownership”
To begin, I am going to draw out in detail how dog owners considered this notion 
of ownership in their relations with their dogs. all the persons I spoke to referred to 
themselves as the “owners” of “their” dogs, and at first glance, their employment 
of the label3 “owner” would appear to implicitly infer that they saw their dogs as 
being a form of property. In turn, this would seem to negate any notion that these 
owners saw themselves as being in a relation with other social persons. Within the 
body of literature that focuses on animal rights and animal welfare (e.g. Francione 
1995; Cavalieri 2001; Hauser et al. 2006; Singer 2006), the notion of animals as 
property is one that has been much criticised. The argument is offered that by 
giving animals the legal status of property, and thus by putting them in a position 
where they can be owned, they are reduced to objects and the apparent hierarchy 
3 Borkfelt (2011) offers a detailed discussion on how the act of naming affects human relations 
with animals.
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in the human-animal relation is reinforced. It is for this reason that some scholars 
propose that the legal status of animals needs to be changed, where animals are 
granted the status of legal personhood (cf. Francione 1995). However, for my 
purposes here, I do not want to enter into a detailed discussion of the intricacies 
of the debates in the literature on animal rights and animal welfare. rather, I will 
outline in more detail how dog owners treated ownership as more a relation of 
responsibility than the possession4 of a “thing”. This sense of responsibility on the 
part of the owners appeared to come from what they saw was a need to help their 
dogs negotiate the “human world”. 
nearly all of the dog owners described their dogs as no longer living in their 
“natural” habitat, and this appeared to have substantial implications for the form 
their relation took. Very often they explained that when dogs lived in their “natural” 
state they roamed in packs and survived on their instincts,5 as they claimed their 
dogs ancestors the wolves had done. however, these owners argued, due to the 
fact they were now living with humans in a city, their dogs were no longer able to 
rely on their natural instincts or the pack. In fact, now that their dogs were living in 
this “human world”, their dogs’ natural instincts were a source of concern for their 
owners since they were worried they might work against them. For instance, one 
owner told me how she tried to make sure that her dog did not eat things when they 
were outside. She said that when she discovered him chewing something when 
they were on a walk, she would order him to spit it out. her explanation was that 
although it was probably his natural instinct to eat any food he finds, in that this is 
what he would do in the wild, in this context it was dangerous because someone 
might have laced some morsels with poison. She said that he could not know “how 
bad some humans can be”, and therefore she felt that it was her responsibility to 
use the knowledge she had about humans to protect him. another area where 
owners foregrounded the responsibility they had towards their dogs was when 
they spoke about their dogs’ health care. They all said that when their dog was ill 
they would take them to the vet, and nearly all of the owners whom I spoke with 
said that after they had been to the vet, if their dog had a more serious condition, 
they would read more about it on the Internet. again, they voiced this in terms of 
responsibility, in that it was the responsible thing to do, to use all the knowledge 
they had available to them as humans for the benefit of their dogs. Subsequently, 
my impression of these owners’ narratives was that they considered themselves 
4 It is not possible to assume that all ownership relations imply possession (cf. Strathern 1999).
5 It was in these conversations that often the television personality Cesar Millan (2006) was 
mentioned. The owners would say that they found his programmes and books very helpful in un-
derstanding their dogs. When I asked them why they said because in his programmes and books he 
offered the dog’s perspective, and in this way helped to explain to them things that their dogs were 
saying that they had not previously understood. They said that what they liked about his approach 
was that he treated dogs as dogs, rather than dogs as humans. See Millan (2006:11) for an example 
of his “dogs as dogs” approach.
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as gatekeepers for their dogs who were “now” living in a “human world”. Since 
their dogs were no longer in their own or “natural world”, owners saw themselves 
as being in a constant negotiation between their dogs’ natural instincts and needs, 
and the needs of the human world in which their dogs were living. On the basis 
of this, and to return to their dogs’ status as “property”, I would therefore propose 
that at no point did this ownership relation result in the owners considering their 
dogs as animate objects. 
nonetheless, although owners foregrounded what appeared to me to be a moral 
responsibility in their relations with their dogs, it would not be possible to say that 
the legal obligations in this relation were totally absent. all the owners told me 
that as dog owners they had certain legal obligations, such as the need to vaccinate 
their dogs, and that in the city legally their dogs should wear a muzzle and be on a 
lead. When I asked them about other legal obligations of this relation, such as the 
ones set out in the Law on Animal Protection and the City of rijeka’s Ordinance 
on how pets should be kept, they said they were not aware of them. all of the 
owners, bar one, stated that they had never read these Ordinances or Laws, or 
the pamphlet published by the City of rijeka entitled What do you need to know 
about pets? (Mijanović et al. 2006) that offers a summarised outline of these 
Ordinances and Laws. Thus, in terms of their understanding of the legal relation, 
it appeared these owners had not reflected upon their legal obligations too deeply. 
however, when they spoke about the issue of dog-training, the legal aspect of this 
relation did become an issue. nearly all the owners spoke of the importance of 
training their dogs and teaching them to listen to their commands. When I asked 
them why they were so keen that their dogs behave in these prescribed ways, they 
offered the point that they wanted their dog to be “good” and “listen” to them so 
that they could be outside when they wanted. One woman told me that her dog 
never listened to her and that she wished he would because then they would be 
able to go to the park to play with other dogs. She explained that “in the wild” 
her dog would most probably “sort it out” with the other dogs as they would in 
the wild, but because they were living in the city she could have problems with 
the other owners if this were to happen. She told me that she was worried that the 
other owners might sue her if her dog bit their dogs, especially as the law said that 
they should be on a lead and muzzled at all times. As she said “I am not worried 
about the other dogs, I am worried about the humans, by law if he bit another dog 
and was declared aggressive he could be put to sleep, and that is why I need to 
protect him”. It is her point that as the owner she would be sued because of her 
dog’s actions that I want to consider in detail now. This sense of responsibility that 
dog owners so often foregrounded when talking about their relations with their 
dogs is perhaps the result of one quite distinctive feature of this relation. This is 
its “singular” quality, where it would seem that in human social relations, owners 
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are considered by others, and consider themselves, to be the only meaningful, or 
perhaps visible, humans in their dogs’ lives. 
an area where this singular quality of the dog-owner relation was most 
apparent concerns what happens to dogs’ bodies after they have died. The 
issue of what to do with the bodies of their dogs after they have died was one 
that was of considerable worry for many owners. They told me that by law they 
were not allowed to bury their dogs, and instead must send them to be burned 
in a furnace in another part of Croatia. Many of them described this practice as 
being “inhuman”. However, in one part of Rijeka there is a graveyard for animals, 
and although it is not officially in use anymore there are still a number of animal 
graves there. Quite a few of these graves have been built using the same materials 
that are the same shape and size as the graves in the human graveyard. When I told 
other persons that I was interested in the graveyard for animals, many responded 
that this practice of burying dogs and other animals in this way was “not normal” 
and some persons reacted quite strongly. When I asked them why they felt so 
strongly about this, they told me it was not “right” to bury a dog in a human-like 
grave. They said that although they could understand that persons loved their dogs 
and wanted to give them an appropriate burial, building a grave like this for them 
was “wrong”. At first I interpreted their “negative” reactions in terms of a reaction 
to what they saw as a transgression6 of the boundaries they perceived were present 
in the human-animal relation. By burying their dogs in a human-like grave, they 
were giving their dogs a human-like status. yet, a comment by one man suggested 
otherwise, or perhaps offered a more nuanced interpretation of the “nature” of this 
transgression. he said that the problem he found with humans burying their dogs 
in this way was because he didn’t see “the point of it”. Upon my enquiring what 
he meant by this he said that these graves were an act of self-indulgence on the 
part of the owner. he explained that he felt part of the reason why humans build 
graves for other humans is so that the “family” has somewhere to visit, whereby 
graves offer a focal point for the grief of those left behind. however, he argued 
that in the case of dogs, the only person who will want or need to visit this grave 
is the owner since this is the only human relation the dog has. he posited that 
there will be no visits by relatives to visit the dog’s grave on all Saints Day, nor 
will friends of the dog pass by to light a candle on his grave. Thus, in his eyes the 
“source” of the owners’ indulgence was that the owners had built a grave that only 
they would visit.
Irrespective of whether one accepts his argument that the construction of 
graves is predominately motivated by the need for bereaved persons to have 
somewhere to visit, it is his point that owners are the only meaningful human 
relation that dogs have that I want to consider. From the position of an observer 
6 In light of the edited edition by Giffney and Hird (2006) Queering the non/human, one might 
describe this transgression as a “queering” of the human-animal relation.
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one might be tempted to argue otherwise, in the sense that dogs might postulate 
they have other meaningful human relations (such as neighbours, vets, other 
members of the household). Nevertheless, according to the owners’ (as well as 
others) conceptualisation of this relation, their dogs become visible7 both in the 
human world, and in human social relations, through the relation of ownership. 
On the basis of the narratives offered by dog owners above, one might say that 
they conceive of the ownership relation as being a linking device8 between two 
worlds – their dog’s “previous” natural world and the human world. Thus, in 
terms of the flow of knowledge between dog owners and their dogs, the singular 
quality9 of this relation results in all human knowledge passing through the owner 
to her dog. One might say that the humans in this relation act as filters, or funnels, 
through which human knowledge must flow. Even visits to the vets involved this 
act of funnelling, whereby the owners had to first take their dog to the vet in order 
for the vet to be able to apply their human knowledge to the dog.
however, on the basis of the owners’ narratives on this relation, knowledge 
does not only flow in a unidirectional fashion, it also flows10 from dogs to their 
owners. In my conversations with dog owners, they often told me that their dogs 
had told them things. a number of owners said that their dogs told them a lot 
about the character of another human from the way they reacted to that person. 
For instance one man told me that he knew for certain that his neighbour was a bad 
person from the way his dog reacted. he told me that he had always had doubts 
about this particular neighbour, but it was only when his dog had started growling 
at him that his suspicions were confirmed. He explained that it was because of this 
that he was always very cautious in his dealings with this neighbour. In addition to 
this, I also observed that dog knowledge can inform the practices of other humans 
through the mediation of their owners. On one occasion a group of about eight of 
us were walking in the dark on a path towards a mountain refuge where we had 
7 See Strathern’s (1999:3-6) discussion on the “ethnographic moment” for further consideration 
of the role of “time” in the ethnographic project.
8 This “link” is further evident when one thinks about stray dogs. In the absence of this human 
connection, even though they are still very much present in the world, being ownerless they appear 
less visible in the field of human relations. It would be interesting to think about this in terms of 
Malkki’s (1992) discussion on rootlessness.
9 In my mind, it is the singularity of this relation that makes it notable in comparison to other 
relations. For instance, in kinship relations (i.e. parents-children), children are still considered to 
have meaningful relations with other persons. It is perhaps this singularity that creates the intimate 
effect of this relation between dogs and their owners. See Kuzniar’s (2006:107-135) discussion on 
intimacy.
10 I think we can see this flow of dog knowledge in other areas, such as in those dog-human 
relations where dogs are labelled as working or service dogs and where the owners become labelled 
as handlers. Other examples of relations where dog knowledge informs the practices of humans 
are between police dogs and their handlers, service dogs and their owners, and sniffer dogs and 
doctors.
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arranged to stay the night. On the one side of the path there was a field, and on 
the other side there was a very thick forest. One of the people on the walk had 
brought his dog with him, and he was at the front of the group walking with his 
owner. Since it was winter and quite icy, we were walking very carefully in a row. 
everyone was holding onto each other or their bags that they had brought with 
them for the night. There was a bright moon so although it was dark it wasn't pitch 
black. The atmosphere was very light-hearted. People were joking and teasing 
each other about who was going to fall over on the ice first and talking about how 
walking on such icy ground in the dark was probably not a sensible thing to be 
doing. But after about ten minutes of walking, suddenly the dog stopped dead in 
his tracks, and started to bark. he was looking in the direction of the forest, was 
growling and barking, and was in a hunched position that looked like he was 
ready to attack something. Since we were walking in a row, and the front of the 
group had stopped, we all stopped. One of the members of the group asked the 
owner whether this was normal, if his dog normally stopped in his tracks and 
barked like this. The owner replied that it wasn't at all normal, that he must see 
something in the forest since he never did this on walks usually. The atmosphere 
in the group changed from being one of merriment to seriousness. even though it 
had been the source of teasing only a few moments earlier, someone commented 
that it was really actually very stupid to be walking in the dark on the edge of 
forest, especially considering that it was a known fact that the forest had bears 
in it. Someone else asked the dog’s owner whether they thought he had seen a 
bear. The owner said that they had no idea what his dog had seen, but that he had 
definitely seen something. The dog was still looking in the direction of the forest 
and barking. We all agreed to carry on walking, but the mood in the group had 
changed greatly. rather than being a noisy joking atmosphere, there was an air of 
tension and fear. Some people were whispering about what one was supposed to 
do if confronted by a bear, while others were saying that it had to be something 
else because it was winter and bears were supposed to be hibernating. One person, 
in what appeared to be an attempt to alleviate the tension, said that maybe the dog 
had got it wrong and had seen something that wasn't there. But this suggestion was 
rebuked by the rest of the group where they offered the argument that there was 
definitely something there because (a) his owner had said he didn't normally react 
like this, and (b) they were sure that dogs can see things that we cannot as humans. 
The knowledge he offered through his body “language” was taken seriously by 
the majority of the group. Therefore to sum up, I would suggest that knowledge 
flows through the dog-owner relation, between humans and dogs on equal terms.
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“hot house” Descriptions
although, there appeared to be an equal exchange of knowledge between dogs 
and their owners, there is, however, a very slight but critical “turn” in the way 
these relations manifest themselves in the field of human relations. Even though 
dogs and their owners have this apparently singular relation in that they are what 
Haraway (2003) might term “a becoming”, at the same time, the humans in such 
relations are also part of a network of human relations. For instance, earlier I 
mentioned how one dog owner spoke of her concern that she might be sued by 
other dog owners if her dog bit their dogs. If her dog was to bite another dog, she 
would be sued by other humans. In being sued, she would enter into an exchange 
relation with other owners about her dog, and in these human exchanges her dog 
would most probably take on the guise of an object. In terms of the flow of 
dog knowledge in human social relations something similar occurs: in human 
exchanges it also takes on the form of an object. It is this objectification of dog 
knowledge, both in non-academic relations and academic relations that I consider 
now. 
One noticeable “characteristic” about the narratives offered by dog owners 
about what their dogs had told them was an apparent lack of concern on their part 
as to how these accounts might sound in relation to other human accounts about 
dogs. For example, they explained to me that their dogs told them things, that they 
warned them about possible dangers from other humans, or they described how 
their dogs were sometimes embarrassed or grumpy. Seemingly, the tone of their 
accounts about their dogs seemed to take a very similar tone to Darwin’s account of 
his dog’s “hot house face” (Darwin 2009 [1890]:3), when he was disappointed he 
wasn't going for a walk. In Crist’s (1999) account, she examines Darwin’s account 
of the expression of emotions in animals in detail since she says that it has been 
quite often criticised in more recent scholarship as being anthropomorphic. Due 
to the apparent similarity in tone and content between the narratives offered by 
dog owners on their dogs and Darwin’s account of his dog, one might therefore be 
tempted to also describe them in terms of being anthropomorphic. But I argue that 
to do so would be problematic. all the owners I spoke to were extremely aware 
about the issue of anthropomorphism, and when I raised the point with them that 
their narratives might be determined by some humans as having anthropomorphic 
qualities, more than once I was told that those humans who made such comments 
had obviously never lived with a dog. 
It was this response that I found notable, since they did not appear to show 
any concern about how their narratives might relate to other narratives about 
dogs or what other humans might think of the way they spoke about their dogs. 
What makes it notable is that within academic discourses about animals there 
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does appear to be evidence of this concern. For instance, in Nadadsy’s (2007) 
article about the relation between Cree hunters and animals in north america, he 
describes an “extraordinary experience” that he had with a rabbit and his problems 
about what to “do” with this experience. As he describes during his fieldwork on 
Cree hunting practices and beliefs, he set some rabbit snares about half a mile from 
his cabin, and whilst the snares were in place, he observed a rabbit escaping from 
one. Five days later, he discovered a rabbit outside his house with a snare around 
its neck, and was quite certain that it was the same rabbit that he had observed 
earlier. He said that he had a very strong impression that the “rabbit came looking 
for me, that it had quite literally given itself to me” (Nadadsy 2007:36), which 
he describes as being an experience that “fits” Cree ontology about the animal-
human relation.  as he outlines in his article, in Cree ontology of the animal-
human relation, animals regularly speak to humans in this way and thus when he 
explained what had happened to Cree persons they offered the same interpretation 
of the rabbits’ behaviour as he had. But for him, it raised the issue of what to “do” 
with this “experience” and how to treat it analytically. He writes:
no matter how relevant and useful such experiences may be to understanding the 
people with whom we work, we tend not to report them for fear of embarrassment 
or of becoming the objects of suspicion among our colleagues (the “Castañēda 
effect”). (Nadadsy 2007:36. Emphasis added)
A further instance of this scholarly concern is visible in Crist’s (1999:41-49) 
discussion on the use of “anecdotal evidence” in academic discourses about 
animals. Referring to Griffin’s writing, she also points out a form of scholarly 
“self-censorship” in scholarly narratives about animals. She writes:
While the “official unusability” of anecdotal data weeds out the occasional tall tale 
with respect to animal capacities, it also excludes exceptional or unique information 
(ibid.). Further, in connection to the question of animal mind, Griffin has noted that 
because of the disparagement of anecdotal data, “field observers often fail to report 
evidence suggestive of conscious thinking even when they obtain it, and editors 
of scientific journals are reluctant to publish it” (1984:14, 15). (Crist 1999:40. 
emphasis added)
Thus, in contrast to dog owners who did not express any such apprehensions when 
speaking about their dogs, visibly there is scholarly concern as to what they can 
and cannot include in their narratives on animals. 
Here it is helpful to consider this difference in light of Strathern’s (2004) writing 
on the travels of knowledge. Strathern suggests that in order for knowledge to be 
able to travel, it firstly needs to be rendered portable. As she highlights, when one 
thinks about academic knowledge production in this way, it becomes apparent that 
the transformation of information into knowledge involves what could be described 
as being an awful lot of work. In the production process, where Strathern (2004:19) 
writes that publications are the academic product par excellence, information 
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needs to be gathered, choices have to be made about what information gets put 
into a publication and what is left out, the fledgling product has to be reviewed 
by other scholars, its relation to other publications in the form of citations has to 
be made visible and so on. It is only when all this has been accomplished that 
knowledge becomes visible as a product: in the form of a publication. Strathern 
therefore suggests that when contemplating how knowledge is rendered portable, 
one should go back a stage “to the actual site of the creation of the product, to the 
point at which everyone is still working together, and the outcome is still in the 
future” (Strathern 2004:20). In relation to my interests here, this suggestion by 
Strathern (2004) to go back a stage to the point where the “outcome is still in the 
future” is very informative. When one takes one’s focus of analysis back a stage 
to the “site of creation” and considers how dog owners spoke about their dogs and 
how scholars write about animals, in my mind, there is a noticeable difference. 
On the basis of Nadadsy’s (2007) and Crist’s (1999) discussions on the exclusion 
of certain types of knowledge about animals in the academic product, scholars are 
seemingly moving backwards and forwards in time. During the writing process, 
they are already considering the effect of their outcome, the publication, which 
at this particular point (at the site of creation) is still in the future. Due to their 
concern that certain observations might have a detrimental effect on the projected 
outcome of their product, they then appear to “return” to the present where they 
choose to filter them out. In contrast, dog owners do not appear to move backwards 
and forwards in time. And one might interpret this absence of “time-travel” in the 
case of the dog owners as a result of there being an absence of a projected product 
or outcome, at least on their part. When offering their narratives about dogs, dog 
owners did not have to consider the effects of these narratives on the outcome or 
product. In this particular situation, and in what can be described as a “not quite 
replication” (Strathern 1991) of their role as mediators between their dogs and the 
human world, concerns over the outcome or product rest upon my shoulders (as 
the author of this text). Once again, in a “not quite replication” of what they were 
doing in their relation with their dogs, as the author of this article I am the one 
who negotiates their interests and the interests that are present in what one might 
call the academic field of social relation. This, as a wealth of anthropological 
knowledge has argued, involves an act of mediation or translation, which one 
might say is similar to what dog owners are engaging in when they are negotiating 
their dog’s interests with the interests of other humans.
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hierarchies of knowledge
It is with this in mind that I want to return to the issue I outlined at the beginning of 
this article. how might the relation between dogs and their owners help us in our 
considerations of how to construct an analytical framework that treats the animal-
human relation as a social relation? It seems to me that that there are a number of 
things we might learn from dog owners, but I will only focus my discussion on 
one point here. This concerns the way in which dog owners maintain a conceptual 
difference between humans and dogs, but at the same time do not consider this 
difference in terms of hierarchy. In terms of knowledge, their dogs’ knowledge 
had the influence to inform their practices as much as human knowledge did. As 
in the example of the dog’s reaction to a creature in the forest that I offered earlier, 
sometimes they treated what their dogs were telling them to be more informative11 
than what humans were saying. Yet, in Crist’s (1999) account on what counts as 
anecdotal evidence in scholarly descriptions of animals, the discourses offered 
by dog owners would seem to fit under the auspices of “anecdotes” in that they 
are “singular instances of animal behaviour” (Crist 1999:40). Within the field of 
academic social relations, these narratives would most probably be considered 
to be “anecdotes” about dogs and not “knowledge” about dogs at all. They have 
not been through the scientific process of corroboration (peer review), scholarly 
discussion, any analysis of their relation to other knowledge products, and so on. 
In turn, I think it is also plausible to conjecture that outwith the field of academic 
social relations a similar distinction might be made between the knowledge offered 
by dog owners and the knowledge offered by scientists. as a reader interested in dog 
behaviour, one might take an ethological text about dog behaviour more seriously 
than an account offered by a dog owner with no scholarly training. In turn, 
anthropological knowledge about animals is also quite probably going to be 
considered less valid than the knowledge offered by other scholars who are 
“specialists” in the field of animal behaviour. Ever since the time of Aristotle 
and even earlier, in the Euro-American context, the “decisive” line of difference 
between humans and animals has very often been held up as being the “point” 
that animals do not speak, or perhaps more pertinently they do not write. At first 
glance, this might seem a rather tired observation to make, but in my mind it has 
very serious implications. It seems unlikely, at least for the time being, that animals 
are going to be able to exchange their knowledge with humans as equal partners 
in academic knowledge exchanges. In academic knowledge exchanges, animals 
11 In my mind, the way dog owners see animal knowledge is summed up by a point made by 
Viveiros de Castro (1998) in his writing on Amerindian perspectivism about how animals see. He 
writes: “[A]nimals see in the same as we do different things because their bodies are different from 
ours” (Viveiros de Castro 1998:478).
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will continue to “require” a human to represent them.12 This has considerable 
consequences in terms of the issue of how we, as anthropologists, might construct 
an analytical framework that treats the human-animal relation as a social relation. 
Observations about animal relations and animal practices are left to the “experts”, 
who are trained to read the “body” language of animals. One might say that as 
anthropologists, we are trained as ethnologists but not ethologists. This is a point 
that has been mentioned by others. For instance, in a discussion about whether 
anthropologists should take a less anthropocentric approach in their research and 
also focus on animals, Mullin (1999) makes the point that such an approach “[It] 
does raise a number of problems for anthropologists, just one being the fact that 
very few of them know much about animals other than primates (and most know 
extremely little about primates than other humans)” (Mullin 1999:217). But has 
this problem always been present? Kirksey and Helmreich (2010) have pointed 
out that “[S]tudies of animals have a long lineage in anthropology, traveling back 
canonically to texts such as Lewis Henry Morgan’s 1868 The American Beaver 
and His Works” (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010:549). Although one could argue 
that Morgan’s (1868) interest in beaver practices was to gain an insight into human 
practices, and thus direct similar criticisms to the ones I outlined at the outset of 
this article, what I find thought-provoking is that as an anthropologist he was able 
to publish a book about beaver practices. 
I find this thought provoking because a seemingly more recent development in 
academic social relations appears to be an interest in who is “qualified” to speak 
about animals, and in my mind this is closely connected to the wider and much 
discussed issue of who owns knowledge. This is where I think we can learn from 
dog owners. according to the way they approach the notion of ownership in their 
relation with their dogs, they see it as a relation of responsibility and negotiation 
between two different fields of interests and needs. They do not, however, consider 
themselves to own their dogs as things. neither do they regard dogs as products, 
nor do they see their dog’s knowledge as a human product. Indeed, what at times 
makes their dog’s knowledge more informative to them than human knowledge is 
the very point that it is not human knowledge. nevertheless, because this relation 
is labelled as an ownership relation in human social relations, dogs become visible 
“in” their owners, and in turn, owners become visible in their dogs. Thus, even 
though dog owners see a difference between themselves and their dogs, others 
may not read their relation in this way. 
I think that it is more than possible to relate this point to academic social 
relations. as the authors of our texts, we give them our names, and we are seen by 
others as the “owners” of these texts. In addition, when we speak of others’ texts, 
we refer to them using the name of the author. Thus, the knowledge within these 
12 In fact one might be tempted to state that it is this act of representation that makes animals 
“animals”.
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texts is often considered to be “owned” by the authors. But, in academic social 
relations, if ownership was approached in the same way as dog owners approach 
it, the relation between the knowledge offered in these texts and the author would 
alter. In the anthropological project, we would become representatives of the 
knowledge of “our” informants, where their knowledge becomes visible “in”our 
texts, but we could not claim to own it. For example, from this perspective and 
in relation to this particular text, although I have put my name on this particular 
academic product, the knowledge that makes up this text includes knowledge 
from dogs, rabbits, meerkats and humans. It is, in effect, a multi-species or 
multi-animal knowledge product, and yet it is presented and will be treated in 
academic social relations as being solely a human knowledge product. as Crist 
(1999) has so thoroughly described in her account of the “mechanomorphic” 
treatment of animals, in academic knowledge production, animal knowledge that 
is made visible in academic products is shaped by the conventions and practices 
of that particular “specialism”. And furthermore, considering the point offered by 
Nadadsy (2007) in his discussion of what to “do” with the exchange he had with a 
rabbit, any (potential) knowledge products that fall outside the boundaries of these 
conventions and practices are often regarded as being highly questionable. 
Therefore, in terms of how we might analytically approach the animal-human 
relation as a social relation, and following the example of how dog owners treat 
their dog’s knowledge, I propose that it might be very worthwhile to consider 
animal knowledge as a product in its own right. From this starting point, we 
could then turn to investigate ethnographically how “animal products” become 
visible in the field of human social relations (both academic and non-academic). 
For instance, how does the knowledge offered by a police sniffer dog become 
transformed into legal evidence that is meaningful in human relations? This may 
seem a rather experimental suggestion in that it would require taking animal 
knowledge seriously, and treating it as an artefact in its own right, but I would 
argue that those anthropologists who have advocated treating their “informants” 
knowledge practices in this way have already demonstrated how much can be 
gained from such an approach. 
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“PSI NE GOVORE”. RAzMATRANJA O PROTOKU zNANJA 
IzMEđU PASA, ANTROPOLOGA I LJUDI
SAŽETAK 
Paul Nadadsy (2007) se u prikazu ljudsko-životinjske društvenosti u Yukonu osvrće na zazor 
antropologa prema doslovnom shvaćanju narativa koji komunikaciju između životinja i kazivača 
predstavljaju kao recipročnu i ravnopravnu. Prema njemu se taj zazor može vezati uz činjenicu da 
su antropološke teorije o odnosu ljudi i životinja sve do danas onemogućavale antropolozima da taj 
odnos “sagledaju” na bilo koji drugi način. “Antropološki zazor” u članku razmatram iz perspektive 
svojih istraživanja odnosa ljudi i pasa u svakodnevnom životu u Rijeci. Dok neki smatraju da se 
protok i razmjena znanja između pasa i ljudi odvija u ravnopravnim uvjetima, drugi razmjenu i 
protok smatraju limitiranom čime se, čini se, približavaju shvaćanju odnosa između ljudi i životinja 
u antropološkim teorijama. Pritom, kao i u antropološkim teorijama, svoje gledište objašnjavaju 
time što “psi ne govore”. Navedenu razliku u pristupima u nastavku teksta propitujem etnografski 
i uspoređujem je s antropološkim tretiranjem odsustva jezika/govora u životinja. Tvrdim da bi 
antropološki zazor mogao biti proizvodom znanstvenog “mrtvog kuta” koji proizlazi iz specifičnosti 
razmjene i protoka znanja u akademskoj zajednici. Riječi (u obliku usmenih kazivanja ili pisanog 
teksta) su medij kojim se u antropološkom polju znanje najčešće, premda ne nužno, dijeli i 
razmjenjuje. Potrebno je stoga uzeti u obzir sljedeće: u polju u kojem se znanje u pravilu razmjenjuje 
riječima nužno su ograničene mogućnosti ravnopravnog tretmana znanja vezanog uz odnos koji ne 
počiva na riječima. 
Ključne riječi: životinjsko-ljudski odnos, produkcija znanja, protok
